Bulk of the answers under this question seriously fail to understand the relative matters of power of these two states.
The Imperial Germany was a juggernaut in 1914. It fielded the world’s second largest and qualitatively best navy, its industrial base was tremendous, but the true power of it was its land army. The Kaiser’s army in 1914 consisted of eight field armies of well trained, equipped, and led soldiers whose battlefield superiority was undeniable in the first months of the war. There was no draft-based army in the world that was as powerful as the Imperial German Army, well trained and leisurely equipped by abundant numbers of machine guns and field artillery.
By relative comparison the Wehrmacht of 1939 was an army straight out of the previous century.
The situation of the Wehrmacht arrayed against its enemies in the West on 1940, almost twenty-six years after that fateful August day when the old order of Europe shattered in a storm of artillery fire and cracking rifles, was one that would make the Prussian army generals of old mourn and weep of how far the mighty have fallen.
Germany had arrayed three million men for its invasion of France and the Low Countries, an admirable mass of men that gave Germany ample chances on paper. Yet truth was far darker. 45 percent of the arrayed men were forty years old or even older, and fully half of the army was critically undertrained, having been shipped to the front after a few weeks of training at best. Only ten percent of the army was even somewhat motorized, with 120.000 trucks in an army of three million men, the supply lines were almost entirely horse-drawn and over half of the motorized infantry were mounted on bicycles. As things stood in 1940, only half of the German divisions in the West were considered combat ready, and most of those were, let alone matching to the French and British, were not even equipped up to the level of the German Army in 1914.
For all their advantages in the superior quality of their officers and NCO’s, their revolutionary doctrines, and the high morale stemming from instilling each soldier with a national purpose, the Heer in 1940 was operating under severe shortages of everything that made it a decidedly weaker force than the armies arrayed against it. Even with the superiority of the Luftwaffe factored in, in the Prussian method of pitched battles the Heer stood no chance against the French and British armies it was ordered to destroy.

If it was not for this man, the result of Fall Gelb would not be the total and decisive victory in six weeks it became. It would not even be the pitched, long-lasting trench warfare on a scar-like, ever unchanging front line across France and Low Countries the like of which was witnessed in the Great War as the maneuver offensive of the German Army failed. No.
If it not for Erich von Manstein’s decidedly unorthodox genius, the fate of the German Army in 1940 would be a sharp and back-breaking defeat, resulting in the collapse of the Third Reich in 1941 at latest.
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